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Résumé: Un modèle de commerce international en équilibre général est présenté, avec 
deux zones, deux biens et deux facteurs de production, où, du fait de rigidités 
salariales, le libre échange génère du chomage et par conséquent une situation 
moins bonne que l'autarcie du point de vue d'une des zones et de certains 
agents. 
S'il existe une mobilité entre les deux facteurs, qui sont du travail qualifié et 
non qualifié, des théorèmes sont cependant établis montrant que, donnée une 
dynamique d'ouverture de l'économie, si la vitesse de mobilité du travail est 
supérieure à certaines limites, où si la vitesse d'ouverture de l'économie est 
inférieure à d'autres limites, le libre échange peut être obtenu à revenu 
croissant pour chaque zone. S'il existe en plus la possibilité de redistribuer les 
revenus entre les agents, des théorèmes de même nature montrent que le libre 
échange peut être obtenu avec une satisfaction croissante pour chaque agent. 
 
Abstract: A general equilibrium model of international trade is presented, with two 
zones, two goods and two factors of production, where, due to some rigidities, 
free trade leads to unemployment and thus to a situation worse than autarky 
from the point of vue of some zone and of some agents. However, if there is a 
possible mobility between the two factors, which are unskilled and skilled 
labour, theorems are proven showing that, given a dynamics of opening of the 
economy,  if the speed of the mobility of labour is above some limits, or if the 
speed of opening of the economy is below some other limits, then free trade 
can be obtained through increasing incomes for each zone. If in addition there 
is a possibility of income redistribution between the agents, then similar 
theorems show that free trade can be obtained through Pareto improving 
situations 
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Abstract
A general equilibrium model of international trade is presented, with two zones, two
goods and two factors of production, where, due to wage rigidities, free trade leads to unem-
ployment and thus to a situation worse than autarky from the point of view of some zone and
of some agents.
However if there is a possible mobility between the two factors, which are unskilled
and skilled labour, theorems are proven showing that, given a dynamics of opening of the
economy, if the speed of the mobility of labour is above some limits, or if the speed of opening
of the economy is below some other limits, then free trade can be obtained through increasing
incomes for each zone.If in addition there is a possibility of income redistribution between the
agents, then similar theorems show that free trade can be obtained through Pareto improving
situations.
2
Introduction
The optimality of free trade is usually discussed, and proved, in the framework of gen-
eral equilibrium models where all markets, including the labour market, are balanced(see for
instance Krugman[1993]). A general equilibrium model is presented here where, due to some
social rigidities, in fact wage rigidities, free trade between two zones generates unemployment.
The situation may then appear to be worse than autarky from the point of view of some
zone and of some agents. However, if there is a possible mobility between the two factors
of production that we consider -namely unskilled and skilled labour- then, according to the
degree of this mobility, the level of the income of each zone can be saved. Moreover, if there
is also a possibility of redistribution of income between the agents, their level of utility can be
preserved too. More specifically, if one considers precise dynamics of opening of the economy,
relations between the speed of opening and the mobility of labour appear, giving conditions
for the income of each zone, or the utility level of each agent, to be saved or increased at each
stage. Then, from the point of view of the zone or of the agents, each stage, including the final
free trade situation, appears to be Pareto superior to the previous one, including the autarkic
situation.
Section I presents the model : two zones, two goods, two factors which are two types of
labour, the trade between the two zones being regulated by quotas. Section II introduces an
equilibrium concept, which can lead to different precise equilibria according to the assumptions
made for the mobility of factors. Section III considers trajectories of opening of the economy,
which allow to give a precise definition of the mobility of labour, and also explicit dynamics
of opening. Section IV then proves a first proposition linking mobility and evolution of the
income of the zones ; two theorems are given stating that if the speed of the mobility of labour
is high enough, or the speed of opening low enough, then the income of each or both zones can
be saved or increased at each stage. Section V proves a second proposition linking mobility
and the utility level of agents, supposing there exists a possibility of redistribution of income
; then two additional theorems are given, stating that if the speed of the mobility of labour
is high enough again, or the speed of opening low enough again, then the utility level of each
agent can be kept or increased at each stage, which is thus Pareto equivalent or superior to
the previous one. Section VI last concludes with some comments regarding the respective
advantages of “big bang” and progressive transitions to free trade, the model obviously giving
support to the second type of scenario.
1. The model
The model presented here, which has already been used in Fuchs[1997a and b], considers
exchanges between two zones, North and South, both consuming and producing a good number
1 named textile just for the image, while a good number 2, more sophisticated, is consumed in
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the two zones but only produced in the North. Goods 1 and 2 are produced from labour only,
through constant returns to scale technologies with coefficients k1 and k2, identical for textile
in N and S1. An essential feature of the model is then the existence of two types of labour :
an unskilled labour available in quantity `1 and `
′
1 in N and S respectively, for the production
of textile ; and a skilled labour, available in N only in quantity `2, for the production of good
2. Let wi(i = 1, 2) and w
′
1 be the corresponding wages in N and S respectively, that we shall
suppose to be measured in an internationally accepted nume´raire. We shall suppose logically
that :
w2 > w1 > 0 (1)
but also that:
w1 > w
′
1 > 0 (2)
just because unskilled labour is plentiful in S and considered not to be mobile. Production of
goods 1 and 2 will thus be bounded between 0 and :
yi = ki`i and y
′
1 = k1`
′
1 (3)
and will take place if their local prices are related to wages though:
pi = wi/ki p
′
1 = w
′
1/k1 (4)
with, from (2) :
p1 > p
′
1 (5)
Then we shall suppose that `1 and `2 are in fact the number of unskilled and skilled
workers of N , who are endowed with identical utility functions u of the form
u(ci) = (c1)
µ(c2)
1−µ (6)
where ci is the individual consumption of good i and 0 < µ < 1. We suppose that workers are
wage earners trying to sell a unit of labour, i.e. they look for the maximal level of u under a
budget constraint where the only income is wage and, possibly, positive or negative transfer
revenues. The situation in S, where a high level of unemployment and a large informal sector
are permanently supposed to exist, will not be described in detail. It will only be supposed
that the income S can earn by possibly selling textile to N is totally used to buy good 2 from N .
Last, we shall specify the relations between N and S by the volume q ≥ 0 of textile
authorized to be introduced in N at price p′1
2. Because of (5), consumers of N (who are the
producers) will try to buy imported textile before “local” textile. For small values of q (the
word “small” will receive a precise definition later on) demand for imported textile will be
higher than supply so that we have to consider a “rationing scheme” (see Benassy[1982]). For
1This identity is only considered here for the sake of comparison with H.O.S models and is not a necessary
characteristic.
2Quotas could also be seen however as the result of a policy of voluntary export restriction by S.
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the sake of simplicity, we shall consider a scheme proportional to demands i.e. we suppose
that, given q, a worker of type j (j = 1 or 2 according to the fact that he is unskilled or skilled)
can buy a quantity cjq of textile at price p
′
1 with
(i) cjq = α(q)c1(p
′
1, p2, wj)
where α(.) is a continuously increasing function of q with α(0) = 0 and where ci(p
′
1, p2, wj) is
the solution of the program :
max u(c1, c2)
under
p′1c1 + p2c2 ≤ wj
which gives
c1(p
′
1, wj) =
µwj
p′1
c2(p2, wj) =
(1− µ)wj
p2
(7)
For the cjq to define a rationing scheme we then must impose in addition :
(ii) λ1c
1
q + λ2c
2
q = q
where λj ≥ 0 is the number of active workers of type j in N for a a given q (so long there are
no transfer revenues, possibly unemployed wage earners of N can buy nothing ; we shall in
what follows forget about the integer character of the λj and consider them as percentages of
the `j). Given (i) and (ii) one then gets easily using (7):
cjq = wj
q
W (q)
(8)
where
W (q) = λ1w1 + λ2w2 (9)
is nothing but the total wages, and thus income, in N given q : the share of q that a worker
of type j can buy is just his share in total income.
Let us then consider the behaviour of an active worker of type j in N . He will choose a
consumption bundle ci(pi, p
′
1, q, wj) which maximises u given the facts that :
- he can buy textile at price p′1 up to the quantity c
j
q ;
- if his income wj is high enough he can go on buying textile at price p1.
Clearly then, according to the value of q there are differents situations.
Let q2 be the value of q where rationing stops ie, from (i), α(q2) = 1 or:
cjq2 = c1(p
′
1, wj) (10)
From (7) and (8), q2 is independant of j and given by:
q2/W (q2) = µ/p
′
1 (11)
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Then obviously, if q ≥ q2 all employed workers can buy all the imported textile they wish at
price p′1 :
c1(pi, p
′
i, q, wj) = c1(p
′
1, wj)
c2(pi, p
′
i, q, wj) = c2(p2, wj)
(12)
and we are in a pure free trade situation.
Next, if q < q2, an active worker of type j will solve the program
maxu(cjq + γ1, c2)
under
p1γ1 + p2c2 ≤ Rj ≡ wj − p′1cjq (13)
γ1 ≥ 0
(note that, from (11), Rj > 0). Considering to begin only the first constraint and defining
pi = p′1/p1, an other traditional calculation gives
c1(pi, p
′
1, q, wj) = c1(p1, wj) + µ(1− pi)cjq
c2(pi, p
′
1, q, wj) = c2(p2, wj) + (1− µ)p1 − p
′
1
p2
cjq
(14)
The sum of the values of those two consumptions, at price p1 and p2 respectively, is easily
seen to be wj + (p1 − p′1)cjq, the last term of the sum representing the extra purchasing power
resulting for j from the access to cjq at a cheaper price than p1. Considering now in addition
the constraint γ1 ≥ 0 i.e.:
c1(pi, p
′
1, q, wj)− cjq ≥ 0
we get from (14) :
cjq ≤ 1
ρ
c1(p1, wj)
with
ρ = 1− µ(1− pi) (15)
Let now q1 be the value of q defined by :
cjq1 =
1
ρ
c1(p1, wj) (16)
From (7) and (8), q1 is independent of j and given by:
q1/W (q1) = µ/ρp1 (17)
It is the value at which and above which only imported textile is bought in N . Clearly q1 < q2
(because p′1 < p1 − µ(p1 − p′1)). Thus, if q ≤ q1, the demand of a worker of type j is indeed
given by (14). If q1 ≤ q ≤ q2 we have, using to calculate c2 the budget constraint of (13) :
c1(pi, p
′
1, q, wj) = c
j
q
c2(pi, p
′
1, q, wj) = c2(p2, wj)/(1− µ)− p′1cjq/p2
(18)
Having specified the behaviour of consumers and knowing those of producers, we then
have all elements to introduce a concept of equilibrium, equilibrium with rationing but general
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equilibrium though.
2. Definition of q-equilibria
In general terms, an equilibrium on the good markets must then satisfy the two conditions
that:
• consumption of textile in N equals production in N plus the import q,
• production of good 2 in N matches consumption of N plus the demand that S addresses
to N using its exports receipts of textile to buy good 2.
Analytically these equalities read :
k1λ1 + q = λ1c1(pi, p
′
1, q, w1) + λ2c1(pi, p
′
1, q, w2)
k2λ2 = λ1c2(pi, p
′
1, q, w1) + λ2c2(pi, p
′
1, q, w2) + p
′
1q/p2
(19)
Using (7),(14) and (18) both lines reduce to:
- for 0 ≤ q ≤ q1
(µ− 1)w1λ1 + µw2λ2 = ρp1q (20)
- for q1 ≤ q ≤ q2
λ1 = 0
The equivalence of both equations (19) just reflects the facts that total wages sum up to the
value of total production while external trade is balanced. Note that, from (20), q = 0 i.e. the
autarkic situation appears to be compatible with full employment iff:
(µ− 1)w1`1 + µw2`2 = 0 (21)
a condition that we shall suppose to be fulfilled in what follows.
In usual models then, starting from autarky with full employment and increasing q
remains compatible with equilibrium on all markets of N , including the labour markets, if
(see (20) with λj = `j) there is a decrease in w1 or an increase in w2 or a suitable combination
of these two movements. In a dual way, we shall make here the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Wages w1 and w2 are rigid and remain equal to their autarkic value.
Considering actual situations, such an assumption appears to be quite realistic. It means
that, however high is q, the unskilled workers refuse any lowering of their wages ( their wage
level could also be thought of as a minimal wage level defined by a social policy in N) and
that the owners of firms producing good 2 do not accept any wage increase of skilled workers.
We then introduce:
Definition 1 Given a wage differential pi = p′1/p1 = w
′
1/w1, given a quota q with 0 ≤ q ≤ q2,
we call q-equilibrium of the economy a pair (λ1, λ2) satisfying (19) and, in addition, λ1+λ2 ≤
`1 + `2.
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This definition just reflects the facts that, in the absence of wage (or price) adjustments,
it is through unemployment that good markets will remain balanced and that, of course, active
population cannot be greater than total population.
In the three dimensional space (λ1, λ2, q) the set Q of q-equilibria for all q corresponds
in Figure 1 to the union of the triangle OAB in the plane defined by (20) (with A = (`1, `2, 0))
and of the triangle OBC in the plane λ1 = 0. The line OB, from (20) with λ1 = 0 is defined
by :
q = µw2λ2/ρp1 (22)
which, from (17) corresponds to the definition of q1; the line OC, from (11) with λ1 = 0 too,
is defined by :
q = µw2λ2/p
′
1 (23)
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But Definition 1 also allows to consider more precise and very interesting situations. We
are first going to specify two extreme sets of particular interest.
Definition 2 We call q-equilibrium with perfect mobility a pair (λ1, λ2) belonging to Q and
satisfying in addition :
λ1 + λ2 = `1 + `2 = ` (24)
To comment this definition, let us first solve (20) and (24) in λ1 and λ2. The determinant
associated with the matrix coefficient of the λj is easily seen to be ∆ = (1− µ)w1 + µw2 > 0
so there is a unique solution which is, using (21) :
λM1 (q) = (µw2`− ρp1q)/∆ = `1 − ρp1q/∆
λM2 (q) = [(1− µ)w1`+ ρp1q]/∆ = `2 + ρp1q/∆
(25)
One can then interpret these λMj as follows : a level q of imports of textile in N creates a
level `1 − λM1 of unemployment among unskilled workers ; but, simultaneously, appears the
additional amount of skilled work λM2 − `2 = `1 − λM1 for the production of good 2, which
is increased due to the purchases of S. This is possible only if unskilled workers can be
transformed one to one and costlessly into skilled workers, hence our definition. Of course
(25) is only valid for q ≤ q1, between q1 and q2 one has λM1 = 0 and λM2 = `. In Figure 1, the
set of q-equilibria with perfect mobility for all q corresponds to the union of the two segments
AB and BC.
Definition 3 We call q-equilibrium with perfect rigidity a pair (λ1, λ2) belonging to Q and
satisfying in addition :
λ2 = `2 (26)
Solving (20) in λ1 then immediately gives, with the use of (21) again :
λR1 (q) = `1 − ρp1q/(1− µ)w1 (27)
The interpretation now can read as follows : a level q of imports of textile in N creates a
level `1 − λR1 of unemployment among unskilled workers ; but the constancy of the number
`2 of skilled workers means that, this time, there is no mobility between unskilled and skilled
manpower, hence our new definition. Again (27) is only valid for q ≤ q1 : between q1 and q2
one has λR1 = 0 and λ
R
2 = `2. In Figure 1, the set of q-equilibria with perfect rigidity for all q
corresponds to the union of the two segments ABR and BR CR.
Note that perfect mobility corresponds to the border of Q with full employment of all
workers, while perfect rigidity defines the border of the subset Q′ of Q to the left of which both
categories of workers know unemployment. Definitions 2 and 3 thus formalize two extreme
situations where training either is sufficient to change costlessly the necessary number of
unskilled workers into skilled workers or is non existent or inefficient. Within Q′ intermediary
situations can of course also be considered: this will be the entry in the forthcoming sections.
To complete our definitions however, we are going to calculate the function α of (i) which
defines the rationing scheme actually used for the two types of equilibria just introduced. This
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in turn will allow us to check the coordinates of B and C, BR and CR in Figure 1. For
q-equilibria with perfect mobility one gets using (25),(10) and(21) :
- for q ≤ q1
WM (q) =W (0) + (w2 − w1)ρp1q/∆ (28)
and thus :
αM (q) =
p′1q∆
µ[w1w2`+ (w2 − w1)ρp1q] (29)
a short calculation using (17) then gives:
qM1 = µw2`/ρp1 (30)
and one checks easily that λM1 (q
M
1 ) = 0;
- for q1 ≤ q ≤ q2
αM (q) = p′1q/µw2` (31)
and, from (11) :
qM2 = µw2`/p
′
1 (32)
One checks easily that the λMj are continuous in q
M
1 and that α
M is continuous in qM1 and
strictly increasing in [0, qM2 [. For q-equilibria with perfect rigidity one gets similarly using
(27),(10)and(21) :
- for q ≤ q1
WR(q) =W (0)− ρp1q/(1− µ) (33)
hence:
αR(q) =
p′1q(1− µ)
µ(`2w2 − ρp1q) (34)
qR1 = µw2`2/ρp1 (35)
and one checks easily that λR1 (q
R
1 ) = 0;
- for q1 ≤ q ≤ q2
αR(q) = p′1q/µw2`2 (36)
qR2 = µw2`2/p
′
1 (37)
Again the λRj are continuous in q
R
1 and α
R is continuous in qR1 and strictly increasing in [0, q
R
2 [.
Three comments then. First the fact that λ1˙(q1˙) = 0 for both equilibria is not a surprise
: q1˙ is the level of q for which all demands for “local” textile vanish so that all unskilled
workers are unemployed then. Next, for the two types of equilibria, q2˙ where begins free trade
is, without surprise too, equal to the total demand for imported textile of the active skilled
workers (in number either ` or `2). Last, the values q1˙ and q2˙ indeed satisfy equations (22)
and (23) and correspond well to the points BR and B and CR and C of Figure 1.
3. Trajectories of opening, mobility of labour, dynamics
Keeping in mind Figure 1 and the comments already presented we set :
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Definition 4 We call trajectory of opening the data of two continuous piecewise differentiable
functions λj defined on an interval [0, q2], with 0 < q2 ≤ qM2 and such that :
• a pair λ1(q), λ2(q) defines a q-equilibrium ∀q,
• λj(0) = `j ; λ1(q2) = 0, λ2(q2) = p′1q2/µw2
This is just a precise formulation of a trajectory such as AB′C′, starting from autarky
with full employment and ending with free trade and unskilled workers either unemployed or
skilled (i.e. ending with C′ satisfying (22)). Note that the two sets of q-equilibria with perfect
mobility and rigidity define two specific extreme trajectories of opening, which are the two
extreme possible trajectories on Q′. Along a trajectory, unskilled workers try to get skilled
(because it gives access to higher wages) but, due to non explicited rigidities (such as limited
amount of training capacities or unability of some workers), they cannot all succeed (except
for the case of perfect mobility). We then make more precise what we call mobility through :
Definition 5 We call mobility of labour for a given trajectory of opening, the function m of
q given by :
m(q) = [λ2(q)− `2]/`1 (38)
Definition 6 We call sensitivity of the mobility of labour, for a given trajectory of opening,
the function s of q given by :
s(q) =
d
dq
m(q) =
1
`1
dλ2
dq
(39)
A few observations then :
- the set of q-equilibria with perfect rigidity defines a trajectory of opening for which the
corresponding mR and sR are constant to zero ;
- the set of q-equilibria with perfect mobility defines a trajectory of opening for which mM
grows from 0 to 1 and, from (25)
sM =
{
ρp1/∆`1 for 0 ≤ q < qM1
0 for qM1 < q ≤ qM2
(40)
- for trajectories such as AB′C′ in Figure 1, m grows from 0 to a value smaller than 1
and, of course, s is piecewise constant only if AB′ and B′C′ are segments.
It is then worth to be noted that if a trajectory of opening defines a unique sensitivity of
labour, conversely, the data of such a sensitivity defines a unique trajectory of opening. Indeed
we have :
Proposition 1 Given a piecewise continuous function s defined on [0, qM2 ] and satisfying
s(q) ≤ sM for all q, then can be built from s a unique trajectory of opening.
Proof Let us first define the function.
λ2(q) = `2 + `1
∫ q
0
s(q′)dq′ (41)
Using (20) we can build
λ11(q) = [µw2λ2(q)− ρp1q]/(1− µ)w1 (42)
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which can be written with (21)
λ11(q) = `1 + [µw2`1
∫ q
0
s(q′)dq′ − ρp1q]/(1− µ)w1
Now using the inequality on s and (40), the last quantity between brackets satisfies (using the
definition of ∆) :
[ ] ≤ µw2ρp1q/∆− ρp1q = −ρp1q(1− µ)w1/∆
inequality which implies that there exists a smaller value q1 > 0 for which λ
1
1(q1) = 0 and that
q1 ≤ qM1 (because from (30) ρp1qM1 /∆ = `1). Similarly then, from (41) :
λ2(q) ≤ `2 + ρp1q/∆
so that :
λ11(q) + λ2(q) ≤ ` ∀q
and, in [0, q1] the triplets (λ
1
1(q), λ2(q), q) well correspond to q-equilibria. Then, for q ≥ q1, let
us consider the function
q/w2λ2(q)
We have first from (42) with λ11 = 0
0 < q1/w2λ2(q1) = µ/ρp1 < µ/p
′
1
Next, from above, λ2(q) ≤ ` ∀q because in [0, qM1 ] λ2(q) ≤ `2 + ρp1qM1 /∆ = ` and, in
[qM1 , q
M
2 ], s(q) ≤ 0 so that λ2 is non increasing. Thus, so long λ2 ≥ 0.
q/w2λ2(q) ≥ q/w2`
and there exists a smaller value q2 for which
q2/w2λ2(q2) = µ/p
′
1
with, from (32), q2 ≤ qM2 Defining then
λ1(q) =
{
λ11(q) for 0 ≤ q ≤ q1
0 for q1 ≤ q ≤ q2
(43)
it is clear that the pair (λ1, λ2) corresponds to a trajectory of opening.
The constructions made for the proof of Proposition 1 are easily understood when looking
at Figure 1 and at the trajectory AB′C′. Note however that it is not excluded here that C′
be on the left of CR since we have put no lower constraint on s.
To give to the two previous definitions all their interest though, we shall now consider an
actual process of opening of the economy of N . This will be done by introducing the explicit
dynamics :
q(t) = V t t ≥ 0 (44)
where V will be interpreted as the speed of opening of N i.e. the speed along a trajectory such
as AB′C′ (t = 0 is autarky and t grows until a limit value tFT which corresponds to a point
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of Figure 1 between 0 and C and thus to free trade) 3 We shall suppose that V is piecewise
constant and always positive. In complement of Definition 6 we then introduce :
Definition 7 We call speed of the mobility of labour the function vL of t given by :
vL(t) =
d
dt
m(q(t)) (45)
Obviously, using (38), (39) and (44) one just has
vL(t) = V s(q(t)) (46)
But first vL is a quantity that can be calculated from observation since it is just proportional
to the speed of increase of the number of skilled workers through time dλ2/dt. Next, this
definition allows us to introduce a quite reasonable new assumption, namely :
Assumption 2 There exists in N an endogenous maximal speed of the mobility of labour
v0L > 0.
In other words the efficiency of the training processes and capacities in N and the existing
ability of unskilled workers are such that, whatever the chosen trajectory and speed of opening
are, one has:
vL(t) ≤ v0L ∀t (47)
Given all this material, we are now ready to introduce our key Propositions and Theorems.
4. Pareto optimality for zones
We shall use here as a first criterium for welfare of N and S the level of income of each
zone. We shall then make clear that its evolution depends crucially on the degree of mobility
of labour. Of course South always wins to the existence of trade since its workers benefit,
thanks to the sale of the quota q of textile, from the additional income :
∆W ′(q) = p′1q > 0 (48)
But the situation for N is quite different. Indeed one has, according to the fact that q is
smaller or larger than q1˙ :
- in case of perfect mobility, from (28) and (9) :
∆WM (q) ≡WM (q)−W (0) =
{
ρp1q(w2 − w1)/∆ > 0
`1(w2 − w1) > 0
(49)
- in case of perfect rigidity, from (33) and (9) :
∆WR(q) ≡WR(q)−W (0) =
{−ρp1q/(1− µ) < 0
−`1w1 < 0
(50)
(W (0) = `1w1 + `2w2 is also the income of N in the autarkic situation), which means that N
can be winning or loosing to trade. Looking at (49) and (50) however leads us to introduce
the two following additional definitions :
3The choice of V can result either from an autonomous decision ofN (or S) or from some international negociation
such as the Multi Fiber Agreement.
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Definition 8 We call q-equilibrium with constant income for N a pair (λN1 , λ
N
2 ) belonging to
Q and satisfying in addition :
λN1 w1 + λ
N
2 w2 ≡WN (q) =W (0) (51)
Definition 9 We call q-equilibrium with constant global income a pair (λG1 , λ
G
2 ) belonging to
Q and satisfying in addition :
λG1 w1 + λ
G
2 w2 ≡WG(q) =W (0)− p′1q (52)
Given W (0) and (48) the two definitions are self-explanatory. They allow us to prove the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 There exist two limit sensitivities of the mobility of labour sN and sG, with
sN > sG, such that :
- for s ≥ sN (respectively s < sN ), at each stage of the corresponding trajectory of opening,
the income of N is equal to or greater than (respectively smaller than) its autarky level ;
- for s ≥ sG (respectively s < sG), at each stage of the corresponding trajectory of opening
the global income (North plus South) is equal to or greater than (respectively smaller
than) its autarky level4
Proof Using equation (20) defining q-equilibria and together (51) or (52), one gets easily :
- for q between 0 and the value q1˙ which makes λ1˙ equal to zero :
λN1 = `1 − ρp1q/w1
λN2 = `2 + ρp1q/w2
(53)
or
λG1 = `1 − [ρp1 + µp′1]q/w1
λG2 = `2 + [ρp1 − (1− µ)p′1]q/w2
(54)
- for q ≥ q1˙ and until the value q2˙ corresponding to free trade :
λN1 = 0 λ
N
2 = `2 + `1w1/w2 (55)
or
λG1 = 0 λ
G
2 = `2 + (`1w1 − p′1q)/w2 (56)
with :
qN1 = `1w1/ρp1 q
G
1 = `1w1/(ρp1 + µp
′
1) (57)
and, using (11):
qN2 = `1w1/p
′
1 q
G
2 = `1w1/(1 + µ)p
′
1 (58)
Straightforward calculations then give
qR1 < q
G
1 < q
N
1 < q
M
1
qR2 < q
G
2 < q
N
2 < q
M
2
(59)
4We shall use the notation s ≥ s′ for s(q) ≥ s′(q)∀q and s > s′ for s ≥ s′ and s(q) > s′(q) on some non zero
interval [0, · · ·].
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Using Definition 6 , one then sees easily that the two sensitivities of the mobility of labour
associated with the trajectories of opening defined above are :
sN =
{
ρp1/w2`1 for 0 ≤ q < qN1
0 for qN1 < q ≤ qN2
(60)
sG =
{
[ρp1 − (1− µ)p′1]/w2`1 for 0 ≤ q < qG1
−p′1/w2`1 for qG1 < q ≤ qG2
(61)
and one can check, using (59), that
sM > sN > sG (62)
Conversely, given sN or sG, one obtains from Proposition 1 the trajectory of opening defined
by λNj or λ
G
j where clearly the income of N or the global income (N plus S) are preserved.
Last, let us consider a trajectory of opening defined by a sensitivity s with:
sM ≥ s ≥ sN , (respectively s < sN )
It is clear from (41) and (42) in the proof of Proposition 1 that the λj it defines satisfy
λj ≥ λNj (respectively λj < λNj )∀j, q
so that we have obviously from (9) and (51)
W (q) ≥WN (q) =W (0) (respectively <) ∀q
Similarly, with sM ≥ s ≥ sG (respectively s < sG) one gets from (9) and (52):
W (q) ≥WG(q) =W (0)− p′1q (respectively <) ∀q
so that, from (48), the global income W +W ′ of North plus South remains equal to or greater
than (respectively smaller than) the autarky level.
Then we can state first :
Theorem 1 Given a dynamics of opening of the economy of N of the form (44) with a speed
V , let vL be the speed of the mobility of labour generated along a trajectory of opening. Then
there exist two limit speeds of the mobility of labour, vNL and v
G
L with v
N
L > v
G
L such that :
- the level of income of N will be saved or increased at each stage between autarky and free
trade iff vL ≥ vNL ;
- the level of the global income of N and S will be saved or increased at each stage between
autarky and free trade iff vL ≥ vGL .
Proof Let us choose
vNL = V s
N vGL = V s
G
Clearly from (59) and (62) vNL > v
G
L . Theorem 1 is then a direct consequence of (46) and of
Proposition 2.
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In other words, while opening N to the textile of S, the speed of conversion from un-
skilled to skilled manpower, is the key variable to control the evolution of income of N or N
plus S : vL ≥ vNL allows to get at each stage a Pareto superior situation for each zone ; so
does vL with v
N
L ≥ vL ≥ vGL in case South accepts cooperatively to give back to N a part of
its surplus sufficient to maintain the income of N not below its autarky level.
Now considering in addition Assumption 2, one can also state the following partial
converse.
Theorem 2 Given an endogeneous maximal speed of the mobility of labour v0L in N , consid-
ering dynamics of opening of the economy of the form (44) with a speed V , then exist two limit
speeds of opening of N , V N and V G with V N < V G such that :
- the level of income of N will not be preserved between autarky and free trade if V > V N ,
it can be kept or preserved at each stage if V ≤ V N ;
- the level of the global income of N and S will not be preserved between autarky and
disappearance of active unskilled manpower in N if V > V G, it can be kept or preserved
at each stage between autarky and free trade if V ≤ V G.
Proof Let us define
V N = v0L/s
N V G = v0L/s
G (63)
with the convention that V . = +∞ in ]q1˙, q2˙[ where s.(q) ≤ 0. Then clearly, from (59) and
(62), V N < V G. Let us then supppose that V > V .. For any trajectory of opening associated
with V , this means that in [0, q1˙[:
V = vL/s > v
0
L/s
.
When vL > 0, then s > 0, s < (vL/v
0
L)s
. ≤ s. from (47) ; when vL ≤ 0, then directly
s ≤ 0 < s.. Thanks to Proposition 2 this proves the first part of the two indents, noting in
addition that, in [q1˙, q2˙], V ≥ V N = +∞ can be read s ≤ 0 = sN (which is not true with
sG which is negative then). Conversely, if V ≤ V ., let us choose the trajectory of opening
defined by s = v0L/V in [0, q1˙[ and 0 after. Then clearly s ≥ s. which, from Proposition 2
again, finishes the proof.
In other words, opening N to the textile of S at a sufficiently low speed allows to control
the evolution of income of N or N plus S. More precisely, if possibilities of mobility of labour
are fully used, V ≤ V N allows to get at each stage a Pareto superior situation for each zone ;
so does V with V G ≥ V ≥ V N in case South again accepts to share suitably its surplus.
5. Pareto optimality for agents
We shall now use as a criterium for welfare the level of utility of each agent. The situa-
tion is then much more complex and subtle.
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First the situation is more complex because of unemployment. Except in case of perfect
mobility, all q-equilibria with q > 0 are such that some unskilled workers are unemployed :
see Figure 1. Thus, from (6), they have a zero level of utility, lower than in case of autarky.
That means that except for opening processes ending in point C of Figure 1, there is no direct
hope to have any free trade situation Pareto superior to autarky. This leads to introduce the
additional assumption that there exists in N possible redistribution policies. More precisely
we now consider the following four types of agents j′ = 1, 2, 3, 4 where:
• j′ = 1 corresponds to the active unskilled agents (they are λ1),
• j′ = 2 corresponds to the initially active skilled agent (they are `2),
• j′ = 3 corresponds to the unemployed unskilled agents (they are `− λ1 − λ2),
• j′ = 4 corresponds to active skilled but initially unskilled agents (they are λ2 − `2) .
We then set:
Assumption 3 Given any q-equilibrium and the associated incomeW (q) of N , the authorities
of N can proceed to redistributions ofW (q) giving to an agent of type j’ the income wrj′(q) where
the wrj′ , (q) satisfy :
λ1w
r
1(q) + `2w
r
2(q) + (`− λ1 − λ2)wr3(q) + (λ2 − `2)wr4(q) =W (q) (64)
Note that the situation considered in Fuchs [1997b] of an unemployment benefit αw1 for non
active unskilled workers (0 < α < 1), financed by a solidarity tax proportional to activity
revenues, is just a particular case of the situation above (with wr3(q) = αw1, w
r
2(q) = w
r
4(q) =
w2 − (`− λ1 − λ2)αw1 × w2/W (q), wr1(q) = w1 − (`− λ1 − λ2)αw1 × w1/W (q)).
Then we can state the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Redistribution does not affect total demands. Thus levels of unemployment and
employment are unchanged and the new situation obtained is a q-equilibrium corresponding to
the new income distribution.
Proof Keeping the rationing mechanism introduced in Section I, the individual demand func-
tions associated with the income distribution (wrj′(q)) have the same form as has been already
calculated, with wrj′(q) instead of wj and c
j′
q = w
r
j′(q)q/W (q) instead of c
j
q. From (12), (14)
and (18) we then have using (7) (which derives from (6)) the property that :
ci(pi, p
′
1, q, w
r
j′) = w
r
j′ci(pi, p
′
1, q, 1) (65)
i.e. the demand functions are homogenous of degree 1 in income5. The lemma is then just a
consequence of this property which, associated with (64), implies that :
λ1ci(pi, p
′
1, q, w1) + λ2ci(pi, p
′
1, q, w2) =
λ1ci(pi, p
′
1, q, w
r
1(q)) + `2ci(pi, p
′
1, q, w
r
2(q))
+(`− λ1 − `2)ci(pi, p′1, q, wr3(q)) + (λ2 − `2)ci(pi, p′1, q, wr4(q))
5Note that this property can be obtained from utility functions of a much more general form than (6).
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which achieves the proof.
But next the situation is also more subtle because the utility level of an agent depends
not only on income effects (related to possible unemployment and redistribution) but also on
price effects (linked to the access to q at price p′1). To discuss the two effects together, let us
calculate the utility level of an agent of type j′ in the framework of a trajectory of opening
(λj) satisfying Definition 4 and, for each value of q, using a redistribution process satisfying
Assumption 3.
For q between 0 and q1, using (6), (7) and (14), one gets :
u(c1, c2) ≡ u(q, wrj′(q)) = Awrj′(q)[1 + (p1 − p′1)q/W (q)] (66)
(where A = µµ(1− µ)1−µ/pµ1p1−µ2 ). For this utility level to be equal to the autarky level, the
trajectory of opening and the redistribution process have to be such that :
wrj′(q)[1 + (p1 − p′1)q/W (q)] = wj (67)
with j = 1 for j′ = 1, 3 or 4 and j = 2 for j′ = 2 If this is true, multiplying each equality
(67) by the number of corresponding agents and adding them, leads, thanks to (64), to the
necessary condition :
W (q) + (p1 − p′1)q =W (0) (68)
Let us then consider the pair (λPj ) satisfying together equation (20) and, in addition
λP1 w1 + λ
P
2 w2 ≡WP (q) =W (0)− (p1 − p′1)q (69)
One finds easily the solutions
λP1 = `1 − p1q/w1
λP2 = `2 + p
′
1q/w2
(70)
which are consistent with all the conditions above and define the precise value of q1:
qP1 = `1w1/p1 (71)
which gives the upper bound of the domain in which we have been working. The position of
qP1 with respect to the ranking already obtained in (59) is subtle too. Indeed, one can obtain :
qR1 < q
P
1 < q
G
1 < q
N
1 < q
M
1 (72)
but the second inequality is valid only if pi <
1
2
.
Similarily, for q between qP1 and some q2, using again (6), (7) and this time (18), one
gets
u(c1, c2) ≡ u(q, wrj′(q)) = Bwrj′(q)[q/W (q)]µ[1− p′1q/W (q)]1−µ (73)
(where B = (1/p2)
1−µ). For this utility level to be equal to the level obtained in qP1 , the
trajectory of opening and the redistribution process have to be such that :
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wrj′(q)q
µ[W (q)− p′1q]1−µ/W (q) = wrj′(qP1 )(qP1 )µ[WP (qP1 )− p′1qP1 ]1−µ/WP (qP1 ) (74)
Again, multiplying each equality (74) by the number of corresponding agents and adding them
leads to
qµ[W (q)− p′1q]1−µ = (qP1 )µ[WP (qP1 )− p′1qP1 ]1−µ
which,using (70 and (71), gives the necessary condition:
W (q) = p′1q + `2w2(q
P
1 /q)
µ/1−µ
Let us then consider the pair (λPj ) defined by :
λP1 = 0 λ
P
2 ≡WP (q)/w2 = [p′1q + `2w2(qP1 /q)µ/1−µ]/w2 (75)
(by construction the values λPj (q
P
1 ) and W
P (qP1 ) in (69), (70) and (75) are identical). It is
consistent with the conditions above and, through (11), gives the precise value of q2 :
qP2 = `1w1/(p
′
1)
1−µpµ1 (76)
The position of qP2 with respect to the ranking of (59) is this time frankly complex. It is worth
being calculated though, because it will turn out to be quite useful for our final discussion.
The result can be sumarized through the following sequence of equalities:
qP2 = pi
µqN2 = pi
µ(1 + µ)qG2 = pi
µqR2 /(1− µ) (77)
In other words we always have qP2 < q
N
2 but q
P
2 can be below or above q
G
2 and q
R
2 . For instance
:
qP2 < q
R
2 iff pi
µ − (1− µ) < 0 (78)
We are now in position to introduce :
Definition 10 We call q-equilibrium with constant satisfaction for each agent a pair (λP1 , λ
P
2 )
belonging to Q and satisfying in addition :
λP1 w1 + λ
P
2 w2 =W (0)− (p1 − p′1)q for 0 ≤ q ≤ qP1
λP1 = 0, λ
P
2 w2 = p
′
1q + `2w2(q
P
1 /q)
µ/1−µ for qP1 ≤ q ≤ qP2
(79)
Keeping in mind the construction above, the definition is self explanatory. It allows us to
prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3 There exists a limit sensitivity of the mobility of labour sP such that for
s ≥ sP (respectively s < sP ) at each stage of the corresponding trajectory of opening, a suitable
redistribution of income can be found which guarantees that the utility level of each agent is
equal to or greater than its autarky level (respectively, whatever redistribution of income is used
the utility level of some agents will be lower than the autarky level).
Proof Using (70) or (75) which characterize the trajectory of opening associated with Definition
10 and calling sP the associated sensitivity of the mobility of labour defined through (39) one
gets :
sP =
{
p′1/w2`1 for 0 ≤ q < qP1
p′1/w2`1 − w1(qP1 /q)µ/1−µ/w2q for qP1 < q ≤ qP2
(80)
20
One checks easily that sP < sM and that conversely, given sP , one obtains from Proposition
1 the trajectory of opening (λPj ) which satisfies Proposition 3. If we now consider a trajectory
of opening defined by a sensitivy s with:
sM ≥ s ≥ sP (respectively s < sP )
it is again clear from the proof of Proposition 1 that the λj it defines satisfy:
λj ≥ λPj (respectively λj < λPj ) ∀j, q > 0
so that we have obviously from (8) and (79)
W (q) ≥WP (q) (respectively <) ∀q
This in turn means that it is possible (impossible) to find wrj′(q) satisfying (64) and higher than
or equal to the values defined by (67) or (74) withWP instead ofW , which achieves the proof.
Then we can state to begin with :
Theorem 3 Given a dynamics of opening of the economy of N defined by (44), let vL be the
speed of the mobility of labour generated along a trajectory of opening. Then there exists a
limit speed vPL of the mobility of labour such that at each stage between autarky and free trade
a suitable redistribution of income can be found which guarantees that the utility level of each
agent is kept or increased iff vL ≥ vPL .
Proof Let us choose vPL = V s
P . Theorem 3 is a direct consequence of (46) and Proposition 3.
The comment now is parallel to the one after Theorem 1. And we also have, considering
Assumption 2, the partial converse :
Theorem 4 Given an endogenous maximal speed of the mobility of labour v0L in N , consid-
ering dynamics of opening of the economy of the form (44) with the speed V , there exists a
limit speed V P of opening of N such that no redistribution of income exists which avoids that
the utility level of some agents will be decreased between autarky and disappearance of active
unskilled manpower if V > V P ; there exists redistributions such that the utility level of each
agent is kept or increased at each stage if V ≤ V P .
Proof Let us define V P = v0L/s
P where, as in the proof of Theorem 2, we adopt the convention
that V P = +∞ in ]qP1 , qP2 [ where sP ≤ 0. Then if V > V P , for any scenario of opening
associated with V , this means that in [0, qP1 [ :
V = vL/s > v
0
L/s
P
When vL > 0, then s > 0 and s < (vL/v
0
L)s
P ≤ sP from (47) ; when vL ≤ 0, then directly
s ≤ 0 < sP . Thanks to Proposition 3, this proves the first part of Theorem 4. Conversely, if
V ≤ V P , let us choose the trajectory of opening defined by s = v0L/V in [0, qP1 [ and 0 after.
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Thus, clearly, s ≥ sP and again Proposition 3 applies.
Thus,opening N to the textile of S at a speed below V P guarantees that, if possibilities
of mobility of labour are fully used and choosing suitable redistributions of income, Pareto
superior situations can be obtained at each stage, including the final free trade situation where
quotas are no more binding.
Last, it is worth to be noted that from (61),(62),(80) and (72), one has if pi <
1
2
:
V P > V G > V N (81)
6. Comments and conclusion
Beyond our Theorems, which already bring a clear information by themselves, two se-
ries of comments deserve to be presented to appreciate completely the relation between the
existence of unemployment and the possibility to keep some Paretian features to international
trade. The first series concerns the final levels of unemployment which are compatible with
the Theorems. The final level corresponding to a definite trajectory of opening is given by:
U(q2) = `− λ2(q2) (82)
where q2 is the corresponding solution of (11). Using (23) we can write (82) as:
U(q2) = `− q2p′1/µw2 (83)
From this analytical expression, or Figure 1, one can see that the more the final point
C′ of a given scenario is “on the left”, thus with a lower q2, the greater is U . In the light of
our results and of (83), we can then comment relations (59) and (77) as follows :
- if unemployment generated by free trade is smaller than U(qN2 ) (point C
N of Figure 2),
trajectories of opening can be found along which Pareto optimality for zones is saved or
increased ;
- if unemployment generated by free trade is between U(qN2 ) and U(q
G
2 ) (points C
N and
CG) Pareto optimality for zones can be saved or increased along some trajectories of
opening if South accepts to give North a suitable part of its surplus ;
- if unemployment generated by free trade is smaller than U(qP2 ) (point C
P ) trajectories
of opening can be found along which, with suitable redistributions of income, Pareto
optimality for agents is saved or increased.
Conversely, none of the three possibilities above is available in case the final level of
unemployement belongs to [U(qP2 ), `] and q
P
2 < q
G
2 < q
N
2 .
Now let us keep the same approach but this time in terms of dynamics of opening such
as defined by (44). We are then led to our second series of comments, which concern the old
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discussion between the advocates of bing-bang procedures to go from autarky to free trade
and the supporters of progresive opening. In our model, clearly, a big-bang attitude means the
choice of an infinite speed of opening in (44) which, from (46) and supposing that Assumption
2 holds, corresponds to a trajectory of opening with a zero sensitivity of the mobility of labour,
i.e. to the scenario of perfect rigidity of labour described by the path ABRCR of Figures 1 or
2 (it is quite logical that, since training takes time, big-bang opening implies constancy of the
volume of skilled labour force). Revisiting our comments above then allows us to say, keeping
in mind Definition 3, (59) and (77):
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- a big bang dynamics creates a level `1 of unemployment ;
- a big bang dynamics can in no way allow to preserve the income of North, even if South
accepts to share its surplus ;
- a big bang dynamics may lead to a situation where no redistribution of income exists
allowing free trade to be Pareto superior (from the point of view of all agents) to autarky.
The last two statement just reflect the fact that, on Figure 2, CR is to the left of CN and
CG and may be to the left of CP too. More precisely, this last situation will occur any time
inequality (78) is violated, i.e. in the hatched zone of Figure 3, where the separating line is
the curve of equation piµ = 1− µ.
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Figures concerning the actual values of pi can be found in U.S. Department of Labor
[2002]. Roughly speaking, in terms of cost of labour, there appears to be two categories of
countries in the South : Newly Industrialized Countries (such as Taiwan, South Korea, Sin-
gapour...) where the cost of labour is around 30 to 40 % of what it is in the North, and
countries just beginning to enter international trade (such as Bulgaria, China, Roumania or
India) for which the cost of labour is below 10 % of what it is in the North. Just for the image
then, in Figure 3, µ = 0 gives pi = 1/e = 0, 37, µ = 1/2 gives pi = 0, 25 (remember that, from
(6), µ measures in some sense the interest of the consumers for textile).
Now, coming back to our discussion, to save or increase both incomes of N and S, or
at least to increase the global income of N plus S, to be sure that income redistributions
exist which make free trade preferable to autarky for all agents, and, in any case, to limit the
number of unemployed people, in a situation of non activity and assistance, a dynamics of
progressive opening of North appears to be the best way.
Final rewording of our theorems can then be:
- given a definite dynamics of opening with speed V , there is a minimum speed of the
mobility of labour
vML = V/s
M (84)
(where sM is given by (40), 1/sM = +∞ where sM = 0) which allows to preserve full
employment and thus income of all agents in N ; for smaller values of vL, if trajectories
are in zone 1 of Figure 2, the income of N is preserved ; in zone 2, the income of N
plus S ; in zone 3, the utility level of all agents (using suitable redistributions of income)
; to the left of ABPCP , nothing can be preserved ; all along unemployment has been
increasing.
- given a definite maximal speed of the mobility of labour v0L, there is a maximal speed of
opening
VM = v0L/sM (85)
(with VM = +∞ where sM = 0) which preserves full employment and all incomes ;
for higher values of V , with s = v0L/V , trajectories will be respectively in zone 1
(V ≥ V N ), 2’ (with C′G instead of CG : V G ≥ V ≥ V N ) or 3’ (with C′P instead
of CP : V P ≥ V ≥ V G). The properties of all these zones can then easily be compared
to those of the big bang trajectory ABRCR.
As an empirical conclusion, we shall thus say that the optimal opening policy which
can be deduced from our model and could be the goal for the authorities of N is a policy
which controls the speed of opening V in such a way that, at each moment, all initially un-
skilled workers are either training or trained and employed. Such a policy allows to follow
the trajectory ABC which, for sure, represent here “the best of worlds”. Then, the higher
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is V above this limit, the greater is the task of the authorities of N : a simple redistribution
improving initial nominal incomes first ; an additional negociation with the authorities of S
next ; a redistribution improving real but not necessarily nominal incomes, thus more difficult
to explain to the different agents, last.
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